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BEING PASHTUN - BEING MUSLIM: CONCEPTS OF PERSON AND WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

In: B. Glatzer (Hg): *Essays on South Asian Society: Culture and Politics II*. (Zentrum Moderner Orient, Arbeitshefte, 9). Berlin: Das Arabische Buch 1998 (S. 83-94).

Since its beginning the recent Afghan *jihad* was not only directed against an alien invasion and an imported ideology, but also against obsolete internal political structures which long before 1978 had encroached on traditional values without improving the standard of living of most people. After the withdrawal of the Red Army the country is still under considerable influence from outside powers which do not allow Afghanistan to come to terms with her own social and political problems. A case in point is the recent emergence of the powerful Taliban movement whose success is partly due to Pakistan's support. Basically the Taliban are an indigenous movement whose motives of action are rooted in the norms and values of a large part of the traditional society. In order to analyse the present civil war in Afghanistan indigenous as well as exogenous factors have to be taken into consideration as well as the motives of the acting persons who consciously reflect their role in different contexts, be it local, regional, interregional, inter-ethnic, and international.

In spite of Afghanistan's retrogression into a pre-state situation, and in spite of the violence and terror the media are so eager to report on, there is a remarkable process going on in the country: in most areas of Afghanistan civil life has returned and rehabilitation with and without international aid is proceeding successfully and fast.¹ This proves that civilian values and actions counterbalance those of the "*Pathan warrior*".

This paper will deal mainly with Pashtuns - the largest single ethnic group in Afghanistan. "Afghan", "Pashtun", "Pukhtun" have originally been synonyms and are still understood so by a large part of the local population, although the Afghan state officially includes all ethnic groups under this term.

Half of the 17 to 20 million Pashtuns live in Afghanistan the other half in the Pakistani provinces NWFP and Baluchistan.

They were called the world's largest tribal society (Spain 1963) because of their number and their all embracing genealogical charter which links the thousands of Pashtun tribes to one apical ancestor.

Although comparative research among different social groups in Afghanistan is lacking we have no indication that there are significant differences between the ethnic groups as notions and concepts of

person and Islam is concerned. The reason why I concentrate on the Pashtuns is that we have more detailed and elaborate emic and etic sources on personal norms and values of Pashtuns than on other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Their idea of a charter of ethnic pride and self-understanding is condensed in the term *pashtunwali* with several efforts to codify it in written. ²

The Pashtun ideology of war and violence, of the martial and heroic behaviour of men is named *turá* (lit. "sword"). Readiness for violence and war is but one aspect of the traditional ideal of a male person; the other aspect is *aql*: "reason", particularly in the sense of social responsibility.

A man of *aql* is one who reasons and acts in an integrative social way, he is hospitable and generous, he grants asylum, reaches to balanced social judgements and is able to act as a mediator in conflicts.

The concept of *turá* and *aql* includes to know when to draw the sword and when to put it back to the sheath, when it is time to fight and when it is time for caring for the welfare and unity of one's family, clan, tribe or of wider social units, up to the Muslim *umma*, depending on one's social horizon.

When we consider the duality of *turá* and *aql* we may understand why bands of anarchic Afghan warriors were able to inflict heavy defeats to the super-powers of their time, and why most tribal warriors laid down their arms the day after their victory and went home to plough their fields. ³

The Image of the Noble Warrior

Several times in Afghan history invasion armies, superior in number, technique, and organisation, received "bleeding wounds" (Gorbachev). Persians, Moghuls and the British had to make this experience. After three major defeats the British had to give up the plan to colonise the country. In 1842 the first attempt of the British General Governor of India to occupy Afghanistan permanently and to enthrone a puppet Amir ended in complete disaster, the British ambassador got assassinated and the British garrison with more than 16,000 soldiers and their attendants perished during retreat in the gorges of eastern Afghanistan. Even in distant Germany this event became a subject of poetry:

*"Mit dreizehntausend der Zug begann,
Einer kam heim aus Afghanistan."
[with thirteenthousand the campaign began,
one came home from Afghanistan].⁴*

In London this defeat was felt with particular pain and shame because it was not the armies of imperial Russia or of another big power which inflicted this set-back to British expansion but unorganised bands of "savages". During the following assessments of the disaster the "savages" soon mutated to noble warriors, to descendants of Alexander the Great or to "Aryans", i.e. they were styled as a sort of Europeans against whom to lose was not considered that shameful. The unspoilt Afghans were said to have preserved all the

male virtues of antique times and were depicted as a model for the contemporary youth, similarly as Tacitus idealised the ancient Germanic virtues. It was Mountstuart Elphinstone, officer of the East India Company, researcher and influential writer, who in 1815 laid the foundation for the idealisation of the Afghans in his famous "*Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*". In open sympathy he compared the anarchic and fiercely egalitarian ("*republican*" as he called them) *Afghaun* tribes with the most noble human groups the Scottish aristocrat and humanist could think of, that is with Scottish clans and with Greek-Roman republicans.

Afghan intellectuals, poets and authors, traditionally multilingual, were well aware of what was said and published on their people abroad, they were of course pleased to see their people so characterised in such a positive way and added their own writings and teachings. No wonder that the ideal image of the Pashtun/Afghan as the noble, gallant, dauntless and generous warrior soon became the subject of legends, ballads, and elaborated ethnic and tribal self representations among the Pashtun tribes who lived not too far from British-Indian cultural influences (at least those between Kabul and Peshawar, Swat and South Waziristan). From there the image was taken-up again by European authors and was further elaborated, particularly when more British military defeats at the North West Frontier were to be explained. Thus an elaborate image of the ideal Pashtun personally was created in intercultural collaboration. The eastern Pashtun tribes who had to deal with their mighty eastern neighbour merged this personal image with Islam and with their more traditional tribal law to a canon of Pashtunness, the *pashtunwali*.

***Pashtunwali*, the Ethnic Self Representation**

ELPHINSTONE used "*pashtunwali*" only in the sense of the customary law of the Afghans. In RAVERTY's Pashtu Dictionary of 1860 *pashtunwali* is defined as "...*the manners and customs of the Afghan tribes, the Afghan code*." More than hundred years later among eastern Pashtuns *pashtunwali* is used as the explicitly known part of their system of values and norms by which they believe to differ positively from all Non-Pashtuns.⁵ In West Afghanistan the term *pashtunwali* is unknown, there the traditional norms are called *rawaj* which in terminology and content hardly differs from those of their neighbours.

In West Afghanistan the term for the ideal person is *ghairatman*, but Pashtuns there do not claim a monopoly. An Aymaq or Tajik may be as *ghairatman* as a Pashtun, differences are considered rather in degree. (more on *ghairatman* see JANATA & HASSAS). The *pashtunwali* of the eastern Pashtuns serves as a model and an orientation for education, as a guide-line and measure of values for solving conflicts, as a marker of contrast against ethnic outsiders as well as an invitation card for peaceful visitors (hospitality has first priority in *pashtunwali*). With its threatening list of martial self-characteristics it also serves as a deterrent to less peaceful visitors.

Eastern Pashtuns have codified their ideal of person, thus offering us easy access to their scale of values and to their motives for action, but we may easily overemphasise the more spectacular or violent aspects of

pashtunwali such as *turá* and neglect the more subtle points which complete the image of person without which we cannot understand complex sequences of actions.

I base this paper of Pashtun ideals of person mainly on Alfred JANATA's and Reihanuddin HASSAS's research on "The Good Pashtun", on Willi STEUL's monograph on the *pashtunwali*, and on my own ethnographic research among western Afghan nomads in the years 1970 - 1977 and on my experiences as a relief worker from 1990 through 1993 in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

***nang*: Dignity, Honour and Shame**

The central term in *pashtunwali* is *nang*: honour and shame, dignity, courage and bravery. A *nangialáy* brings honour and fame to his tribe. To be called *benanga* ("shameless", "undignified") is the worst possible insult in Pashtu and a deadly threat to the social position of the insulted. Killing the insulter is an accepted way of regaining one's *nang* and social status.

sharm is a decisive part of *nang*. *sharm* can well be translated by the English term *shame*, which encompasses *shame* in the sense of noble modesty as well as its contrary: *shamelessness*. If a boy greedily devours his meal his father will ask him "*sharm nálare?!*" ("don't you have shame?", "aren't you ashamed?"); if a man does not prevent his unmarried daughter from flirting with the neighbour's son people would say "*sharm nálarí*" ("he has no shame") which is an extremely serious insult and can only be answered by a very impressive action. *sharm* has mainly to do with the behaviour of the women of the group whose honour is at stake and with male control over the female half of the society.

The relation to women can be seen better if we analyse the term *namus* which belongs to the complex of *nang*. It means privacy and the protection of its sanctity. In the narrower sense *namus* refers to the integrity, modesty and respectability of women and to the absolute duty of men to protect them. In a wider sense *namus* means the female part of the family, of the clan, tribe and of the Afghan society; in the widest sense it is the Afghan home-land to be protected.

Although *namus* includes the inviolability of women and the duty to protect their honour it does not imply that women stay passive. In Pashtun folklore boldly acting heroines are praised such as Malalay who played a decisive role in winning the battle of Maywand in the Second Anglo-Afghan war 1878-80.⁶ Yet in general men consider young women to be less able to think and act rationally, to have less self-control and to be more inclined to sexual activity, in short they are believed to be an easy prey to any seducer who comes along. Thus men feel obliged to fight for maintaining their *namus*, i.e. first of all to keep the women of their families under tight control and to protect the women from their own "weaknesses".

Neighbours' gossip is even more feared than the actual behaviour of women. Gossip is what erodes *namus* most effectively and is most difficult to control. Better do not let anybody see the women. In urban areas

this leads to an increasing compulsion for women to wear full veil or to remain hidden behind the walls of the family compound. Since the early 1970-s I noticed seclusion of women (*parda*) to expand into the countryside, a process gaining momentum during the recent "holy" war. I estimate that more than a million of women experienced *parda* for the first time in their life when they arrived at refugee camps in Pakistan.

Many of my Afghan interview partners consider *parda* not as an indicator of strength and effective maintenance of *namus*, rather to the contrary, as I was repeatedly told by nomads and peasants in Northwest Afghanistan: A strong man can trust his womenfolk and is sure that no outsider would dare to come near to them, only weaklings need to hide and lock-up their women.⁷ In fact the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran were places of disturbed social and demographic relations. During the war ca. 80 % of the camp population were women, children and very old men, and the relatively small number of younger men felt quite insecure in this alien environment, thus the strict observation of *parda* in the camps was indeed a sign of weakness but people thought there was no alternative in order to maintain *namus*.

In *pashtunwali* the inviolability of women and land is closely connected or even considered to be identical. A common saying is: "*The way to the women leads over the land.*" or "*He who cannot protect the integrity of his family cannot protect anything, anyone is free to snatch away from him what he wants, his possessions, his land.*" Most authors on Afghanistan agree that threatened *namus* is the common cause for violent conflicts. When *mujahedin* were recruited for *jihad* they were told, besides religious arguments, that the (common) *namus* of the Afghans was at stake. In 1978 the first uprisings against the new socialist regime broke out when the new socialist Afghan regime sent young activists from Kabul to the provinces in order to force girls and women to school. People were not principally against female education, but they felt it was neither the state's nor any other's business to interfere in matters where females were involved. So far public and private spheres were always kept neatly separate. People, though grudgingly, did pay tributes to the rulers and even accepted military conscription, but the state's transgression of the line between the public and the private (*namus*) meant war.

***turá* - the Sword**

nang the honour and dignity of a Pashtun has two sides:

- (1) An aggressive one meaning readiness to fight until self-sacrifice symbolised by *turá*, the sword;
- (2) Reason and social responsibility (*aql*). *aql* is deliberate and prudent behaviour intended to benefit one's family and one's wider social environment up to the entire ethnic group, the nation (if such a notion exists) and even up to the entire Muslim *umma*. It reaches from material support to participation in councils, to jurisdiction and mediation in conflicts. These two sides of *nang* are connected with different ages in life: The ideal personality of a young man is supposed to be dominated by *turá*. He may be hot headed and ready to draw the sword (*turá*) or today a Kalashnikow at the slightest provocation. Aggressiveness is his first reaction, reasoning comes second. The virtue of *turá* does not need to be tempered by the young man's

own *aql*, it is supposed to be checked by the *aql* of the elders, the “white beards” (*spin gíri*). Consequently boys are educated to obey the elders.

Many Pashtun clans/tribes have tribal militias (*arbakí, lashkar*) to execute the decisions of the egalitarian councils (*jírğa*). Bound by the discipline of the militia the *turá* of the young men is guided to socially accepted objectives.

During my time as an aid worker I noticed in the eastern Afghan province of Paktia that the tribal social organisation remained intact and functioning in spite of a large pre-war German development project with its deep impact on the local infra-structure. In 1992, after the break-down of the Kabul Najibullah regime most *mujahedin* of Paktia went home, participated in the rehabilitation of their villages and land or rejoined the tribal militia. The organisations who helped in the rehabilitation task were provided *arbakí* (tribal militia) as guards. Thus in a situation where state and government were absent civilian life returned rather smoothly.

turá always relates to an individual. It is not sufficient to belong to a group or unit of bold fighters, every single one has to prove his *turá* in courageous actions. The *turaláy*, the man who embodies *turá* gains distinction by **individual** acts. He fights first of all for his personal honour and autonomy, then for that of his family and clan. A strong motive for displaying *turá* is to demonstrate one's own equality and autonomy and consequently that of one's family and clan and that one has not to bow down before any arbitrary power.

A *mujahedin* commander was usually considered as *primus inter pares*. The *mujahedin* respected their fighting and tactical experience and, most important, their logistic abilities. Every *mujahed* considered himself to be on the brink of becoming a commander. The commander has to prove constantly his superiority, there was no effective military command structure which could impose a commander arbitrarily on any band of *mujahedin*.

Paying obedience to the tribal elders does not contradict the egalitarian principle. The elders are considered as the representatives of reason and tradition, of the collective will of the clan/tribe, but they have to take care that their decisions are understood by the younger as just and as in accordance to the generally accepted values: the elders cannot expect the younger to obey automatically.

The highly individualistic style of the Afghan *mujahedin*'s fighting was feared by the military planners on both sides and seen as a serious strategic problem. Even the Afghan *mujahedin* parties in Peshawar lost control, their function was reduced to logistic tasks and to public relations. I think the Afghan *mujahedin*'s success against the hierarchically well organised Red Army was based on the anarchic and chaotic actions of the Afghan rebels which were unpredictable for any professional strategist. On the side of the *mujahedin* there was no military command to deal with, if one commander was eliminated several new ones replaced him instantly.

Education

Education to *turá* begins early. Fathers scuffle and mock fight with their little sons of three to 10 years of age allowing them to punch at daddy who returns some friendly claps in order to encourage the little fighter to another round. Harmless fighting games between boys are applauded. The education is non-authoritarian, a father is considered to be an example, not a penal authority.

Children are present everywhere, in guest houses, at tribal councils and wherever serious decisions are made. In this way they are introduced to *pashtunwali* and to the traditional values and their practical applications.

Girls and boys are educated towards the same personal values, parents see to it that *pashtunwali* is internalised by girls as much as by boys; girls are present in public councils too and listen carefully. It is generally believed among Pashtuns that women are more strict to adhere at *pashtunwali* than men and less ready to compromise when matters of honour and shame are at stake. The following story of a very popular Pashtun hero may serve as an example for what Pashtuns conceive of an ideal personality:

It is the story of Ajab Khan, an historical figure who challenged the British Empire and serves even nowadays as a model for education:

The Cantonment of Kohat, south of Peshawar was one of the strongest military fortresses of the British Empire. From here campaigns were launched against the hostile and rebellious Pashtuns of the tribal areas along the British-Afghan frontier. *Pax Britannica* may have prevailed elsewhere, the garrison of Kohat was almost constantly at war. The year 1923 was no different, a punitive campaign was carried out against the Bostikhel, a sub-tribe of the Afridi north of Kohat. At this occasion British soldiers trampled into the huts of the Bostikhel and allegedly came too close to the ladies, anyway the *namus* of the Bostikhel was seriously violated and the clan in uproar. A few weeks later at night young Ajab, a Bostikhel together with two companions sneaked into the Cantonment of Kohat through multiple security cordons. They raided the bungalow of an officer named Ellis and kidnapped his daughter Molly. The men made good their escape with the girl and during the next days they paraded in triumph through the Afridi land making a laughingstock of the Empire. In Kohat, Delhi and London emergency committees were formed and the media reported worldwide expressing pity for the girl and mockery for the toothless English Lion. A military action to save the girl was out of question, all the British Government could do was to threaten the Bostikhel and the entire Afridi tribe with frightening consequences.

In the meantime an English nurse walked into Afridi land all alone and unarmed, met Ajab and persuaded him to release the girl. After three weeks Molly Ellis was back in Kohat - unharmed. The British strictly demanded the Afridi to hand over Ajab to the authorities which the Afridi of course refused, but it was a very

serious and conflicting problem for the Afridi tribal council: The extradition of Ajab would have been a breach of *pashtunwali*, but not to hand him over would mean very dire consequences. There was little doubt that the British would repeat what they had done in 1919 when war planes bombarded Pashtun villages. Now came Ajab's second act whereby he completed his heroic deed and which earned him the honorary title of *khan*: Realising that he had brought his tribe into serious trouble he voluntarily emigrated to North Afghanistan where he died a natural death in 1961 as a highly honoured *khan*. He had saved his tribe from drastic punitive actions of the British by renouncing everything which a tribe offers the individual: protection, social security and warmth, in short: social life. Expulsion from tribal land is the severest punishment a tribal court can award, and voluntary exile is considered the highest sacrifice a Pashtun can offer.

For the British this was not enough, the Bostikhel had to pay 42,000 Rupees and Ajab's own land and village was destroyed.

As can be expected from an heroic epic, Ajab Khan and the girl are believed to have fallen in love with each other, but contrary to the rest of the story this is not proven.⁸

Epilogue:

In 1982 I met Miss Ellis in Islamabad where she had followed an invitation of the Government of Pakistan. Accompanied by the Governor of the NWFP she was driven in triumph from Peshawar to Kohat right through parts of the Afridi country. The streets were lined by jubilant Pashtuns and relatives of Ajab Khan offered to carry her on their hands all along the way where she had been abducted, which she friendly declined.

This story illustrates *turá* and the core personal values of the ideal and idealised Pashtun. The colonial power had severely violated the *namus* of the Afridi. An impressive symbolic retaliatory action, an attack on the *namus* of the British was seen as the only way out from disgrace in the eyes of the rest of the Pashtuns. Disgrace is considered a weakness, a social inferiority. If I cannot kill the one who disgraced me I have to disgrace him also, otherwise I would accept my permanent social weakness and inferiority. Through such a dare-devil act as Ajab's, disgrace can even be turned into honour and fame. Ajab's deed is considered by the Pashtuns so brilliant because it was an individual act (with only two companions). Only individual acts lead to honour and fame which then may radiate to the whole clan or tribe.

***khan* and Commander**

As mentioned before the ideal male personality consists not only of *turá* but also of *aqil* (reason and wisdom) as Ajab proved by voluntary exile.

turá unchecked by reason is expected from boys, later social virtues should be added: responsibility for family and for the wider social world. An ambitious Pashtun wants to become *khan*, a person who has proved *turá*, who is sharp in thinking and just and prudent in his judgements, who is an acknowledged

expert of *pashtunwali*, who exercises generous hospitality and who is ready to share his wealth with adherents, guests and all the people under his protection.

A *khan* also provides economic benefits to his clients, e.g. a nomad *khan* organizes access to pastures for his people and deals with state authorities. Among peasants the *khan* cares for irrigation, provides access to improved seeds or even attracts foreign aid organizations to carry out development projects in his area.

The *khan*'s opinion has weight in the local councils and tribal assemblies. His power and influence is measured by the number of his clients and the guests in his *hujra*, his guest house, whom he can expect to take his side in a conflict. A *khan* is called to settle quarrels and to act as a speaker of his adherents.

I met one *khan* who used his fluent German to speak at solidarity functions for Afghanistan in Germany in order to raise funds for his people in Tani (East Afghanistan) - a genuine task for a *khan*.

During the last war in many Afghan areas the *khan* was replaced by the commander (*qumandan*). Now other leadership qualities are on demand, e.g. access to weapons, money and food supplies from Pakistan or Iran. Commanders had to join one of the *mujahedin* parties who were the main distributors of military supplies. The new leaders needed military abilities and had to be physically able to march long distances on foot, because the fronts were constantly moving. Many of the old *khans* could not cope with these new tasks and fled along with their clients to Pakistan leaving their position to the commanders.

Islam, Martyrs, and Victors

So far Islam has not been mentioned much in this paper. The Pashtuns understand *pashtunwali* as an expression of practical and true Islam. Other Muslims may be of a different opinion. During the war when Arab mercenaries criticised their Afghan comrades for deviations in Islamic practice bloody conflicts arose, e.g. when Arabs tore down flags at Afghan graves. Pashtuns claim they are genuine Muslims, not converts as the Iranians, Turks or Pakistanis. As the legend goes, Qais Abdurrashid the apical ancestor of all Pashtuns in his Afghan mountains heard of the Prophet in distant Arabia, went there and became one of the Prophet's first disciples at a time when most Arabs still fought against Islam.

In fact the basic values of honour, shame and readiness to fight (for a just cause, of course) do not contradict the canonical scriptures of Islam, the *pashtunwali* rather elaborates on them or sets slightly different accents. Fighting without a "just" cause is not acceptable in official Islam, even honour and fame of an individual do not justify violence. A Pashtun would argue that the unbridled fighting spirit of young men has to be directed to reason and responsibility, and this is where Islam comes in.

The Islamic concept of *jihad* is not new in Afghanistan. Afghan mullahs called for *jihad* against the British infidels many times. After the Soviet invasion in 1979 when a new *jihad* was declared the whole complex

of the Islamic concept of warfare with its terminology was ready and available. Now the warrior was not only an *arbakí* and a *turaláy* but a *mujahed* too, “one who fights in the *jihad*”. The refugees are not just pitiable displaced people who lost everything, but they bear the honorary title *muhajer* (plural *muhajerin*) as the Prophet on his Exodus (*hijra*) to Madina. The one who aids the *mujahedin* and *muhajerin* and gives them asylum as the Pakistanis and Iranians is an *ansar* as the Prophet’s friends in Madina.⁹ Who dies in a just war is a martyr of religion, a *shahid* (“one who bears witness for his belief”), he goes immediately to heaven irrespective of former sins.

NOTES

- ¹ cf. Asger Christensen, *Aiding Afghanistan: The Background and Prospects for Reconstruction in a Fragmented Society*. Kopenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS Reports, 26), 1995.
Antonio Donini, *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda*. Occasional Papers # 22, The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown, 1996.
B. Glatzer, Kabul ist nicht Afghanistan. *Akzente: Aus der Arbeit der GTZ*. 1/1997:12-15
- ² M. Ibrahim Atayee, (transl. M. Shinwari) *A Dictionary of the Terminology of Pashtun's Tribal Customary Law and Usages*. Kabul: Intern'l Centre for Pashto Studies 1979.
Fredrik Barth, Pathan Identity and its Maintenance. In: F. Barth (ed) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*. Bergen etc.1969.
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Qiyam al-Din Khadem, *Pashtunwali*. [Pashtu]. Kabul: Matba'eh-yi 'umumi 1331 (1952).
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Willi Steul, *Paschtunwali: Ein Ehrenkodex und seine rechtliche Relevanz*. (Beitr. zur Südasienforschung, 54) Wiesbaden: Steiner 1981
- ³ The size of the "armies" of the various Afghan war lords are relatively small in numbers (some ten thousands) compared to the male population engaged in agriculture (millions). The atrocities of this civil war are due to modern weapons not to the numbers of fighters.
- ⁴ Theodor Fontane quoted from Peter SNOY, Die Bevölkerung. In M.R. Nicod (ed): *Afghanistan*. Innsbruck: Pinguin Verlag, 1985, p. 73
- ⁵ B. Glatzer, *Nomaden von Gharjistan: Aspekte der wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Organisation nomadischer Durrani-Paschtunen in Nordwestafghanistan*. Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag 1977, p. 164.
- ⁶ For more on male-female relations among Pashtuns see:
Nany Tapper, *Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender, and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society*. Cambridge: Cambr. Univ. Press 1991.
Audrey C. Shalinsky, Women's Roles in the Afghanistan Jihad. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25,1993, S. 661-75.
- ⁷ cf. N. Tapper, op. cit.
- ⁸ For more on the story see James W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland*. The Hague: Mouton, 1963, p. 154ff

- ⁹ Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont: The Afghan Refugee in Pakistan: An Ambiguous Identity. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 1,2, 1988, p. 141-152.