Pakhtun Ethnic Nationalism
From Separation to Integration ^[1]

by: Adeel Khan (University of New England, Armidale, Australia)

Asian Ethnicity, Volume 4, Number 1, February 2003 Carfax Publishing: Taylor & Francis Group

Abstract: There is many a myth about Pukhtuns. The British colonialists thought Pukhtuns were‘unruly’ people that could not be tamed. When Pakistan came into being, Pukhtun nationalists were regarded as the most serious threat to the new state, and until the 1970s every government persecuted them. But during the last three decades of the twentieth century, Pukhtun politics underwent a sea change. Today, Pukhtuns, who were opposed to the creation of Pakistan and had demanded an independent state of their own, have become one of the most powerful partners in the state hierarchy. This paper critically examines the myths the orientalists have created about Pukhtuns and the changing pattern of Pukhtun politics.

It would be poor psychology to assume that exclusion arouses only hate and resentment; it arouses too a possessive, intolerant kind of love, and those whom repressive culture has held at a distance can easily enough become its most diehard defenders. (Adorno) ²

When the Pukhtun ethnic movement, Khudai Khidmatgar (servants of god), emerged in 1929, it had many interesting points to attract attention. It was an uncompromisingly anti-colonial ethnic movement that was opposed to the partition of India and creation of Pakistan. It was a secular movement that originated in one of the most religious regions of India. It was a non-violent movement of a people who are one of the most violent in the world. After the partition of India, the managers of the new state of Pakistan treated it as the most potent internal threat to the state. But despite that, Pukhtuns, who were one of the least educated people of India, became the third most powerful partner in the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated civil and military bureaucracy of Pakistan within three decades.

All these factors have led many to believe that Pukhtuns had a ‘more developed political and ethnic consciousness’ compared to other ethnic groups in Pakistan.³ But available evidence indicates that this is an overblown and overestimated view of a people whose ethnic ego had already been overfed by the myths created about them by the orientalists. This paper critically examines and reassesses Pukhtun nationalism by looking at the myths about the people and the actuality of their changing socio-economic situation.

Theoretical Framework

There is a widespread trend to see nationalism either as a group feeling that is reawakened by the spread of modernity or to interpret it as a feeling created by industrialism, print capitalism and communication. Anthony Smith is the advocate of the former viewpoint whereas Ernest Gellner emphasises the role of industrialism and Benedict Anderson that of print capitalism and communication.4

The theoretical perspective here, however, tries to demonstrate that neither of these two major trends can explain the emergence of Pukhtun nationalism. I find the argument of Anthony Smith and people like him on the reawakening of ethnicity particularly extraneous, not only for Pukhtun nationalism but for nationalism of any kind anywhere, because it fails to distinguish between ethnicity as a racial, cultural and linguistic group feeling and ethnicity as a political movement. My argument is that ethnicity may be as old as human societies but the politicisation of ethnicity, its emergence as a political movement is something new and must be seen as a modern phenomenon that may not have much to do with its antiquity. On the other hand, I find most of Gellner’s and Anderson’s arguments convincing but their emphasis on industrialism and print capitalism, respectively, less so. Gellner’s and Anderson’s emphasis becomes especially problematic for explaining nationalisms like that of Pukhtuns because, as we shall see, Pukhtun nationalism emerged at a time when Pukhtun society was neither industrialised nor literate. My framework here is more in line with John Brueilly’s argument that ‘the key to an understanding of nationalism lies in the character of the modern state, which nationalism both opposes and claims as its own’.5

Throughout this paper, my focus remains on the role of the interventionist modern state in creating, hardening and radicalising national sentiment when the group (Pukhtun) sees it as not its own, and later in renegotiating, softening and eventually integrating that sentiment into the mainstream state nationalism when the same group comes to see the state as its own. And it is this perspective that has motivated me to reinterpret Pukhtun nationalism to see how and why one of the most radical nationalisms has turned into one of the most conformist groups that shies away from aligning itself with any nationalist struggle.

Socio-economic and Historical Background

Pukhtuns6 are the people living in the southern parts of Afghanistan and northern parts of Pakistan, divided by the British imposed Durand Line of 1893. Whereas in Afghanistan they make an ethnic majority, in Pakistan they are only about 14 per cent of the total population. This paper is about the nationalism of the Pukhtuns of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, where their share in the provincial population is between 70 per cent to 80 per cent.7

What is known of Pukhtun history indicates that the structure of Pukhtun society has been tribal. Most of the Pukhtun land comprises dry mountainous regions close to Hindukush and even the plains in the region, except for the fertile Peshawar valley, are mostly dry. Thus, the agricultural land has not been able to sustain the populace, and therefore their survival had always been precariously dependent on warfare and adventures. The Mughal king, Babur, described the Pukhtuns as a people given to plundering, and it is believed that their political influence grew with a sudden increase in their numbers as well as their role as mercenaries in the Persian and Mughal armies.8 Although the strategic importance of the NWFP as a gateway to India attracted invaders from the north, due to the inhospitability of the land, they would only pass by without establishing their rule. Cut from the outside world, Pukhtun society remained dependent on non-productive economic means of war and plundering, forcing Pukhtuns to be conscious of their survival and security on a daily basis, whereas social and cultural isolation made them inward looking.

The Sikhs, coming from the south, had captured the southern part of Afghanistan, and made it part of the Punjabi empire, but their rule was cut short by the British. Unlike the invaders from the north, the British not only conquered the land but also penetrated it with their military and administrative structure and turned it into a buffer zone between British India and Russia. But even the British did not establish direct rule in the region, and preferred to control it from Delhi through the local khans (landlords), pirs (spiritual leaders) and mullahs (priests). There were two reasons for such a special treatment. First, the region had only strategic importance for the British and had failed to attract any economic and commercial interests. Second, the Pukhtun tribes were virulently resistant to colonial rule and almost every one of them fought against the British and ambushed and killed their personnel and civilians to which the latter retaliated by burning villages and crops, destroying wells and fruit trees and starving women and children by blockade.9 As the British had taken over the region from the Sikhs who had, during their 20-year rule, made it part of their Punjabi empire, initially the region was kept as part of Punjab Province. But in 1901, it was accorded the status of a separate province of the North West Frontier. Still, the tribal territory between the NWFP and Afghanistan, which consisted of two-thirds of the province’s territory, was excluded from the six settled districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, Bannu, Hazara and Dera Ismael Khan, and was given the special administrative status of political agencies of Malakand, Kurram, Khyber, North and South Waziristan.

The NWFP became a province with two kinds of boundary: one that separated British India from Afghanistan and the other that distinguished settled areas from the tribal belt that was part of British India on the map but no-man’s land in reality. Special laws like the Frontier Crimes Regulation, under which people could be summarily sentenced to transportation for life, were devised to deal with the unrelenting resistance. The colonial authorities were so apprehensive of Pukhtuns that when they introduced reforms in India in 1909 and 1920,10 the NWFP was entirely excluded and those who demanded reforms were punished by using the regulation that was meant for civil crimes.

Pukhtun Resistance and Oriental Myths

In 1849, when the British captured the southern part of Afghanistan and made it part of their Indian empire, Pukhtun tribes offered a bloody and protracted resistance to the colonial army. So overwhelmed were the British by the resistance that they seemed to have found the exact opposite, ‘the Other’, of their ‘civilised’ self in the shape of insolent Pukhtuns— the noble savage. Thus started the orientalist discourse of the Pukhtun society as a wild land of ‘unruly’ and independent people that could neither be conquered nor tamed by the invading armies and eulogised them as the martial race that would rather die for its Pukhtunwali (Pukhtun code of honour) than submit to the will of the alien power. The most detailed and the most popular book on Pukhtun history, The Pathans, written by a British governor, Olaf Caroe, is a good example of such stereotyping. Although the first section of the book is based on extensive research and explores the origins and history of Pukhtuns in great detail, when it enters modern times Caroe’s account turns into the history of a relationship between the ‘high-minded’ British officials and the ‘valiant’ Pukhtun tribal chiefs and khans.11 In a rhetorical style, replete with laudatory adjectives, he stereotypes Pukhtuns as a special race of brave and shrewd people. The following paragraph illustrates the point.

The force of Pathan character, the bravery of the Pathan soldier, the shrewdness of Pathan assessments of political realism, once carried the forefathers of this people to high positions of authority outside their own country. So it will be again, and the more easily in the light of the renascence in the home-land, to which in their hearts they return, however far away. They need have no fear that they cannot pull their weight in the larger organism; they are like the Scots in Great Britain. Like other highlandmen, the Pathans of Pakistan will be found before long to be largely in control of the fortunes of their country.12

Such egregiously stereotypical and relativist portrayal of Pukhtuns has become a norm and even the work of professional historians suffers from it. For instance, American archaeologist and historian, Louis Dupree’s rather poetic description in the following paragraph is hardly distinguishable from Caroe’s:

The insolence of the Afghan (Pukhtun), however, is not the frustrated insolence of urbanised, dehumanised man in western society, but insolence without arrogance, the insolence of harsh freedoms set against a back drop of rough mountains and deserts, the insolence of equality felt and practiced (with an occasional touch of superiority), the insolence of bravery past and bravery anticipated.13

This orientalist discourse has become so widespread, and so influential, that the modernist Asians too have resorted to such hackneyed images of Pukhtuns in their presentations. For instance, one of the most damning descriptions of Pukhtuns came from Jawaharlal Nehru, when he said: ‘They are a very child-like people, with the virtues and failings of children. It is not easy for them to intrigue and so their actions have a certain simplicity and sincerity which commands attention.’14 A typical modernist approach that smacks of the seventeenth-century European product of the modern concept of childhood as an inferior version of adulthood—to be socialised, trained and educated.15 The trend that such a discourse has set has obscured the significance of the actual geographical and economic conditions of the region in shaping Pukhtun psyche and has led Pukhtuns to live the myths created about them. The nationalists have, indeed, worked on those myths to create a sense of Pukhtun nation. The notions of bravery, honour, freedom and egalitarianism, all encompassed in Pukhtunwali, have been blown out of proportion. What these accounts of affectionate affectations and romantic notions have done is to make the Pukhtun reality stand as an eternal category larger than its material social conditions and relations. A critical look at Pukhtun actuality, however, demonstrates something quite different.

Economic Changes under Colonial Rule

Despite indirect rule under the British, there were some significant developments that caused some far-reaching changes in the region. These were the introduction of new land revenue system, recruitment of Pukhtuns to the British army, market economy, modern education, and construction of roads and railway lines. The new revenue system imposed through the local khans and pirs, on the one hand, changed the landowner–tenant relationship by introducing permanent landownership, and on the other hand, led to the landlessness of peasants who were unable to pay the exceedingly high taxes. By the 1930s, over 60 per cent of all arable land had been taken over by the landlords. During the 1911–31 period the proportion of peasant owners dropped from 72.5 per cent to 42 per cent.16

The introduction of market economy gave rise to a class of Pukhtun merchants, whose trade was further boosted by the introduction of roads and railways. The capitalist economic relations adversely affected the local artisans who had to compete with the British factory-made articles.17

As noted above, the NWFP had two kinds of boundary: one that separated British India from Afghanistan and the other that distinguished the so-called settled areas from the tribal regions. The colonial administration did not interfere with the tribal regions and, for all practical purposes, they were maintained as no-man’s land. Naturally, when new economic relations were introduced, they were restricted to the settled areas. Thus, with the two kinds of boundary, the NWFP was also introduced to two kinds of economy: in the settled areas, the introduction of new revenue system created a few big landlords and a large number of landless peasants; the market economy gave birth to a Pukhtun bourgeoisie and an increasing number of pauperised artisans and other proletariat.

 In the tribal areas, the old economic relations remained intact, though not necessarily unaffected. That the new revenue system was not extended to the tribal areas had a good reason: most of the tribal regions comprise rugged and dry mountains and patches of infertile land. Therefore, the colonial administration could not expect much in terms of land revenue. But the very fact that the tribal regions were infertile necessitated that the inhabitants look elsewhere for their livelihood. In the face of the expanding market economy in the settled areas, the tribal belt developed its own market economy of smuggled goods and began to smuggle out the arms that were manufactured there.

That the colonial authorities regarded Pukhtuns as one of the so-called martial races provided the people of the region with an opportunity to become state employees. Recruitment to the British army and bureaucracy created a class of salaried individuals who had to interact not only with the British but also compete with other indigenous ethnic groups. As far as competition was concerned, the emergent Pukhtun bourgeoisie, too, had to deal with their counterparts belonging to other ethnic groups. The emergence of the new classes, new status groups, new interests and new demands gave way to the kind of social mobility that was soon to shake up the existing social and economic relations and the patterns of control and authority.

The new class of landowners that had acquired a prominent position in the power hierarchy through a legal right to own land was soon confronted with challenges of new economic formations. Under the new dispensation, the bourgeoisie was gaining power and the salaried class and urban proletariat were looking elsewhere for their livelihood.18

The colonial administration soon realised that to maintain the local power relationships there was a need for an active state patronage of the local elite. It was in the logic of colonial rule to oblige the most loyal and the most powerful among the khans and pirs. A conflict of interests between the big khans and the small khans ensued. A sense of being left out among the small khans gave rise to a feeling of resentment against the colonial government that eventually turned into contempt for and opposition to the latter.

The small khans were left with no option but to appeal to the popular sentiments. There they found a responsive audience among the peasants resentful of the high taxes that had led to their landlessness, among the traders who were unhappy with the influence of the landlords, among the educated ones searching for jobs, and among the state employees seeking promotions. The process of social mobility set in motion by the introduction of the market economy, modern education and state employment, was accelerated by a conflict of interests between the local elites as the disgruntled small khans began to translate their sense of alienation into nationalist and anti-colonial sentiment that eventually took the shape of a movement.

The Emergence of the Nationalist Movement

The first thing that strikes one about the emergence of Pukhtun nationalism is that Ernest Gellner’s19 thesis that the rise of national sentiment results from industrialisation is quite inadequate. If industrialisation is taken as a measure of development, the Pukhtun region was one of the most backward and underdeveloped in British India. Even today, the NWFP is one of the less industrialised and modernised provinces of Pakistan. Also not useful is Gellner’s20 characterisation of agro-literate polity to explain the rise of Pukhtun nationalism because in that he treats agrarian society as a single whole, and does not differentiate between tribal and feudal set up. He overlooks the existence of the agro-illiterate semi-tribal set up that Pukhtun society was at the time.

 Gellner is right in saying that in an agro-literate polity a small ruling minority is rigidly separate from the great majority of direct agricultural producers or peasants and that the ideology of such a polity ‘exaggerates rather than underplays the inequality of classes and the degree of separation of the ruling stratum’.21 But that does not apply to the agro-illiterate semi-tribal Pukhtun polity, because here there is no concept of a ruling class but only of the respectable individuals, which means their status is not hereditary but contested—it is a ‘prestige competition’ in which individuals seek to influence the tribe by their qualities of moral rectitude, courage, wisdom, wealth, etc.22—and therefore, such a society precludes the possibility of a ruling class that can be separated from the rest of the society. This does not mean that such a society is classless.

What it means is that there is no apparent class stratification within the community, the tribe, and therefore only those who are outside the community—i.e. the small minority of occupational groups, like artisans, blacksmith, goldsmith, mullah (the priest) and barber— make a separate class on the basis of their professions that are looked down upon. This is the kind of stratification based on caste rather than class. The ideology of Pukhtun society, Pukhtunwali, exaggerates the notions of honour, freedom and bravery but not that of inequality, hierarchy and authority. In fact, Pukhtunwali abhors any authority other than the one that the community collectively imposes. Even today, when Pukhtun society cannot be described as tribal, its value system, not the legal system though, continues to be regulated by tribal codes and customs.

The rise of Pukhtun nationalism can be explained as a result of the centralised bureaucratic state system’s effort to replace the decentralised agro-illiterate semi-tribal system of control. For even in its indirect form, the colonial state tried to expand its writ through the extension of patronage and imposition of revenue. Nationalism thus became, on the one hand, the small khans’ protest against selective patronage and, on the other hand, the peasants’ opposition to the burden of revenue. And the discontent of the newly emerged status groups universalised and legitimised the nationalist sentiment.

Interestingly, even the external factors that contributed to the rise of Pukhtun nationalism were related to the changes in the state system in neighbouring Afghanistan. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Afghan ruler, Abdurrehman Khan (1880–1901), made an attempt to modernise Afghanistan by devising a policy to make the state institutions efficient enough to penetrate society and to control tribalism.23 With these efforts of state formation came the project of nation building.24 The most ubiquitous symbol of the nation, the national flag, accompanied by the most widely celebrated ritual, the national day, was introduced.

The succeeding regime of Habibullah Khan (1901–19) continued with the project of modernisation and nation building by setting up the country’s first school of modern education, and by introducing the national anthem. During the same period, the country’s first printing press and first newspaper appeared. The stage was set for the first truly modernist and nationalist ruler, Amanullah Khan (1919–29), who gave Afghanistan its first constitution that defined the country as a nation with equal citizenship rights for everyone regardless of their religion. The constitution was written in Pashto language which was later, in 1936, declared to be the national language of Afghanistan, replacing Persian that was hitherto the language of the court.25 History was rewritten to prove that Afghanistan as a nation had existed since time immemorial, and national sport, Bozkashi,26 and national dance, Atan (a provincial dance from Paktya) were made part of the Afghan history and culture. Amanullah’s nationalistic policies, to a large extent, succeeded in creating a sense of Pukhtun nationalism. But Amanullah’s centralising policies threatened to weaken the local power base of tribal chiefs who launched a movement, supported by the British, to depose the monarch. The Pukhtun nationalists in the NWFP considered this a colonial conspiracy against an independentminded nationalist ruler. All this was happening at a time when anti-colonial and nationalist movement under the leadership of Mohan Das Gandhi had already gripped the Indian subcontinent.

In 1929, a minor khan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, launched a peasant movement, Khudai Khidmatgar. It was a reformist movement that proclaimed to struggle for social justice. The peasant base of the movement was understandable in an overwhelmingly tribal and agrarian society that was introduced to modernisation through the expanding system of modern bureaucratic state and market economy rather than through industrialisation or even large-scale rural industry and mechanised agriculture. Despite the emergence of new status groups and their new interests, aspirations and frustrations, however, initially it was the minor khans and peasants who were hit hardest by the colonial policies. In 1900, when the NWFP was still part of the Punjab Province, reforms in the form of Punjab Alienation of Land Act were introduced. Although the Act helped to relieve the Punjabi peasants from the hold of voracious Hindu moneylenders, it did not disentangle the grip of landlords and pirs.27 The Act had little use for Pukhtun countryside where there were hardly any Hindus, whereas the domination of the khans and pirs remained untouched. Ghaffar Khan’s two main sources of influence were Amanullah and his nationalist policies and Gandhi and his non-violent anti-colonial movement.28

His Khudai Khidmatgar was an anti-colonial nationalist movement that professed to awaken Pukhtuns by reminding them of their ‘glorious’ past and to unite them against colonial rule.29 As noted earlier, it is not easy to trace the origins of Pukhtun history. The ruins of Gandhara civilisation in the region may indicate the existence of a great civilisation, but they do not prove that it was related to Pukhtun culture in any significant way, as no link of continuity can be established. But to create a national sentiment, there need not be a national history. It is also part of the nationalist project to create a national history. Ghaffar Khan set himself this project. He started his public career as a social reformer. Even when he turned his social organisation, Anjuman-e-Islahe Afghania (Council for the Betterment of Afghans), into a broader organisation, Khudai Khidmatgar, he categorically declared that it was a social movement rather than a political one.30 A man of great integrity and perseverance, Ghaffar Khan was not famous for his intellect. His main weakness was his lack of understanding of the complex social and political changes that were occurring in his society, and still less comprehension of the colonial system of control that had triggered those changes. He could not grasp the reasons behind the economic and social changes that had brought about a change in the attitudes and perceptions of the people. He was more of an idealist and a dreamer rather than cunning, calculating politician. He romanticised the past and glorified Pukhtun history in a manner that betrayed incoherent thinking and moralistic approach. For instance, in his autobiography he goes into the details of what Pukhtuns used to be and what has become of them, and babbles:

Food used to be simple and because of that people’s health was good, they were not as weak as they are today. There were no spices, no tea. Usury, alcohol and sex without wedlock were considered very bad and if anyone was suspected of indulging in these things he would be ostracised … there was no moral bankruptcy like in today’s world. A guest would be treated to a greasy chicken curry … as far as food was concerned there was no difference in the rich and the poor. The rich and the poor used to dine together. Just like dress and food, houses were simple, too. The huge and comfortable houses of today did not exist, but still the kind of happiness and content that was there in people’s life does not exist today. There were no diseases; men and women had good and strong bodies. Grown up girls and boys would play together till late in the night. They would look at each other as brothers and sisters. Moral standards were very high.31

Such inchoate and trifling ideas could hardly produce a workable agenda based on a political ideology and protected by a clearly thought out strategy for action. The result was a politics of contradiction and ambivalence. Initially, Ghaffar Khan was in contact with various political and religious groups, including the Khilafat movement, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. Soon he opted for an alliance with the Congress, while finding it difficult to cooperate with the Muslim League, which he regarded as pro-British. One reason for his alliance with the Congress, doubtless, was the latter’s avowedly anti-British politics. Another important reason, it seems, was his belief that the Congress could never have a popular support in a province that had the highest percentage of Muslims compared with any province of India, and therefore would have to depend on his support. He worked tirelessly among the Pukhtun peasants and secured a large following for himself. With the support of his Khudai Khidmatgar, the Congress won 17 out of 50 seats in the 1937 provincial elections. The Congress victory looked all the more impressive with its 15 out of 36 Muslim seats in comparison with the Muslim League, which could not win a single seat.

Already wary of the increasing popularity of an anti-colonial group such as Khudai Khidmatgar in the strategically most sensitive region of India, the British authorities were alarmed by the results. Although Ghaffar Khan had no radical social or political agenda, except for his uncompromising anti-colonialism, the big khans, too, became increasingly apprehensive of his growing popularity among the peasants who had already shown signs of discontent with the colonial system of land revenue. Moreover, when Ghaffar Khan’s elder brother, Dr Khan Saheb, formed the provincial government, he stripped the big khans of their power and privileges by depriving them of their positions as honorary magistrates and subordinate judges that the British had conferred on them.

The British authorities soon realised that their policy of patronising the big khans, which they had so far been pursuing, was not going to work in the face of the Congress’ emergence as a popular party. To counter a political party, they needed another political party. The Muslim League, almost completely rejected by the Pukhtuns though, with its claim of being the sole representative of the Indian Muslims, and its anti-Hindu rather than anti-colonial politics quite comfortably fitted into the slot. The big khans who had already begun to look up to the Muslim League, were further encouraged by the colonial patronage of the party. Shortly afterwards, almost all the big khans, most of them with colonial honorary titles, joined the Muslim League.32

But already hated by the peasants these khans were in no position to win popular support. It did not take the British authorities and the Muslim League leadership long to realise that the only way to divert the popular support from the Congress and its ally, Khudai Khidmatgar, was to propagate against the Congress being a Hindu organisation. The Muslim League, with colonial support, began to enlist the support of mullahs and other religious leaders in various parts of the province, for claiming that whoever supported the Congress was working against the interests of Islam. At the same time, the Muslim League was launched in the non-Pukhtun district of Hazara by a Maulana Shakirullah, President of Jamiat-ul-Ulama, who became the first president of the Muslim League, assisted by the secretary of Jamiat-ul-Ulama, as the secretary of the Muslim League.33

The British Governor, Cunningham, instructed the big khans to meet each mullah on individual basis and tell him to serve the ‘cause of Islam’ for which he would be duly paid. The Mullahs were told that in case of good progress they would also be considered for government pension. A Cunningham policy note of 23 September 1942 reads: ‘Continuously preach the danger to Muslims of connivance with the revolutionary Hindu body. Most tribesmen seem to respond to this’,34 while in another paper he says about the period 1939–43: ‘Our propaganda since the beginning of the war had been most successful. It had played throughout on the Islamic theme.’35 In the semi-tribal Pukhtun society, the pirs were quite influential for they were the only non-Pukhtuns who could own land. This enabled them to build their own power base outside the traditional assembly of elders (Jirga) of which they were not entitled to be the members. The dual status of being a spiritual leader and a landlord empowered them to mediate not only between god and man but also between man and man.36 Like the big khans, the pirs, too, were the recipients of official patronage. When the government-sponsored Muslim League campaign for the ‘cause of Islam’ was launched, the pirs extended their full support and started propagating against the Congress and Khudai Khidmatgar. But despite all these efforts, the Muslim League could not muster the support of Pukhtuns. In the 1946 elections, many big khans were the Muslim League candidates.37

The Congress once again defeated the Muslim League and emerged as the majority party with 30 out of the total 50 seats. In the Pukhtun areas, Congress’s victory was particularly impressive with 16 out of 22 seats.

Aside from the Muslim League’s internal feuds and organisational weaknesses, the main reason for its defeat was that its anti-Hindu propaganda and demand for Pakistan were not comprehensible for the majority of Pukhtuns. The number of Hindus in the towns of the NWFP was extremely small, whereas in the countryside they did not even exist. Therefore, the Muslim League propaganda against Hindu domination was simply ‘laughable’ to Pukhtuns.38 Also difficult for the Muslim League was to persuade Pukhtuns that Ghaffar Khan being a friend of ‘Hindu’ Congress was a lesser Muslim, because despite his secular politics Ghaffar Khan was a deeply religious man—a practising Muslim—and always referred to the words and deeds of the Muslim prophet, Mohammad, in his speeches. According to the British and Muslim League plan, the NWFP, as a Muslim majority province, had to become part of the future Pakistan. Ghaffar Khan, who did not believe in the idea of Pakistan and was a staunch ally of the Congress, could not perhaps even think of the NWFP becoming part of Pakistan.

When the creation of Pakistan became a reality and the Congress accepted the partition of India, Ghaffar Khan was ‘completely stunned and for several minutes he could not utter a word’, as for him it was ‘an act of treachery’ on the part of the Congress, which had thrown Khudai Khidmatgars to wolves.39 This obviously demonstrates, on the one hand, his total dependence on the Congress and, on the other hand, his lack of understanding of the political developments that were taking place in the late 1940s. For a while, Ghaffar Khan and his brother, Dr Khan Saheb, were perplexed and did not know what to do. At last they came up with the idea of an independent state of Pukhtuns, and a formal call was made on June 1947 at a meeting of the Khudai Khidmatgar for an independent Pukhtunistan. Ironically, the very demand for a new independent state of Pukhtuns when a Pukhtun state, Afghanistan, already existed became a confirmation of the British division of Pukhtuns.40 The logic of this demand is understandable if one is convinced that nationalism is not about preserving the history, culture and traditions of a people as the nationalists claim but is about gaining and maintaining political power by appealing to popular support in the name of common history, culture and traditions.

Pukhtun nationalists demanded an independent state because they could see that in future Pakistan they would be dominated by the Punjabis, whereas in case of becoming part of Afghanistan they had to give up the politics of Pukhtun nationalism because Afghanistan was already ruled by Pukhtuns. Thus a new national identity was imagined and constructed which shared the past with Afghanistan but did not want a future with it. Afghanistan’s support for the idea of a new state was acceptable but not Afghanistan itself.41 Moreover, Ghaffar Khan, who continuously evoked the past glory of the Pukhtun nation, contemptuously said about Afghans (Pukhtuns): ‘We do not want to be one with those naked people.’42 Thus, the anti-colonial nationalist made the colonial Durand Line that divided Pukhtuns the basis of his brand of Pukhtun nationalism.

By that time, however, the plan for the partition of India and creation of Pakistan had already been finalised, and therefore no new demand was to be entertained. When Ghaffar Khan insisted, the British only agreed to a plebiscite in the NWFP. Ghaffar Khan and his brother Dr Khan Saheb did not like the idea but had to accept it because the latter was the elected chief minister of the province and his refusal would have meant an admission that he was no longer sure of his support among the electorate.

The plebiscite was to be based on the question whether the NWFP should remain part of India or become part of Pakistan. The Khan brothers demanded that the question should be whether the NWFP be declared an independent state of Pukhtunistan or become part of Pakistan. The British authorities refused to oblige. The Khan brothers boycotted the referendum saying that the whole idea was preposterous, when elections had already been held only a year ago and an elected Congress ministry was in office, unless the new demand for an independent state was incorporated.

The Muslim League, once again with the full support of the British officials, launched a vigorous campaign by sending its workers to the villages and denouncing the Congress boycott as un-Islamic and exhorting the people to vote for Pakistan as their religious duty.43 By that time, the Hindu-Muslim riots had already begun to take an ominous turn and therefore the deeply religious Pukhtuns could not be expected to remain untouched even if they did not personally suffer from the carnage.

In the emotionally charged atmosphere when the Congress was not in the field, the officially supported Muslim League propaganda worked very well indeed. Out of the total 572,799 votes, 292,118 (51 per cent) were polled, of which 289,244 (99 per cent) went in favour of Pakistan and only 2,874 in favour of India.44 Although the Congress alleged massive rigging, the referendum had sealed the fate of the NWFP, and it became part of Pakistan. The Khan brothers were left with no option but to change their strategy according to the new political situation.

After the creation of Pakistan, they declared that their demand for Pukhtunistan did not mean an independent state but an autonomous province within Pakistan, where Pukhtuns would have the freedom to live their life according to their social and cultural norms without the domination of Punjabis.45 But the managers of Pakistan were not willing to trust the Pukhtun nationalists, even if they had changed their minds in conformity with the demands of the new political reality. One of the first acts of the founder of Pakistan was to dismiss the elected Congress government in the NWFP. This was the beginning of a highly centralised and authoritarian rule in Pakistan, which had no room for any demands of provincial autonomy and regional self-assertion.

Although Pakistani apologists argue that Dr Khan Saheb’s Congress ministry was opposed to Pakistan, and therefore the central government could not afford to have a hostile government in the strategically sensitive region like the NWFP, the future events proved that he, unlike his brother, Ghaffar Khan, was more of a conformist and opportunist to have created any problems for the Pakistan government. He had given clear assurance to the governor, Cunningham, that no anti-Pakistan activity will be encouraged and that there was no question of declaring the independence of the province.46 The best (or worst) example of Dr Khan Saheb’s opportunism was his concurrence to become the chief minister of West Pakistan under the notorious One Unit, which was imposed against the wishes of the smaller provinces.

What seems to be a more plausible explanation for the dismissal of the NWFP government by Jinnah is:

1. his autocratic style of governance and a distaste for a difference of opinion, and
2. the early managers’ sense of insecurity regarding the future of a country that was termed ‘unnatural’ by its adversaries.

The most objectionable part of Jinnah’s decision to dismiss the NWFP government was that he did not ask the governor to dissolve the assembly and hold fresh elections but advised him to dismiss the ministry and invite a Muslim League man to form the government. Ghaffar Khan, after taking the oath of allegiance to Pakistan on 23 February 1948, however, continued to struggle for provincial autonomy. Pakistan’s response to his activities was even worse than that of the colonial rulers. Soon after the partition, his party paper, Pukhtun, was suspended and, within a year, he and his associates and followers were back in prison. In 1956, his property was confiscated in lieu of fines, whereas prison terms and house arrests continued until his death in 1988.47 But the undemocratic and intolerant political culture of Pakistan, in a way, proved to be a blessing in disguise for Ghaffar Khan, as it saved him from getting down to serious political thinking and working out a clear political agenda and strategy. Otherwise, he would have faced two obvious challenges.

1. After partition, when the British had left, anti-colonial nationalism needed to be transformed into ethnic nationalism. This required new nationalist rhetoric, new ideology and new strategy.
2. So far Ghaffar Khan had depended almost completely on Gandhi and his politics but when the Mahatama was no longer around he had to prove his political credentials, which he had hitherto avoided by claiming to be a social reformer rather than a politician.48

In the face of continued state persecution and imprisonments, however, these challenges were averted. For the next 25 years or so, Pakistan was to see no democratic political activity, nor would there be any elections that would have required the Pukhtun nationalists to legitimise their demands by popular support. The absence of electoral politics, the successive governments’ intolerance for dissent, Ghaffar Khan’s exemplary stubbornness as well as the vagueness of his political agenda all helped to turn him into a legend. He became a saintly character adored by Pukhtun nationalists. But in the ‘profane’ world of market economy and job competition saintliness is not of much use.

Initially, a large number of Pukhtuns were sympathetic towards separatist demands. The reason was that geographically and historically the NWFP and Balochistan have not been part of South Asia. Hence physically and culturally Pukhtuns and Baloch are quite different from the rest of the South Asian people. Even their languages have little in common with South Asian languages and therefore, despite the influence of Urdu, Pashto and Balochi languages still are unintelligible for the neighbouring Punjabis and Sindhis.

Such cultural and linguistic differences were bound to play a role in shaping the political aspirations of the people contrary to the integrationist policies of the Pakistan government dominated by Punjabis and Mohajirs. The sense of a lack of participation became even more jarring due to the absence of electoral politics for more than two decades after the creation of Pakistan. Under the circumstances, the separatist sentiment had the potential to become a serious threat, had there been a strong political organisation behind it. But the ineptitude and ambivalence of the nationalist leadership precluded the possibility of any such eventuality.

The directionlessness of the Pukhtun nationalism, however, did not stop the government from taking it a bit too seriously. The real danger, probably, was not Pukhtun nationalism but the support it was getting from India and Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the only state that opposed Pakistan’s application for membership at the United Nations. Interestingly, Afghanistan’s policy on the issue was as ambivalent as that of Pukhtun nationalists. On the one hand, Afghanistan claimed that after the departure of the British the Afghan border with British India, the Durand Line, had ceased to exist, since it had lost its validity the moment one of the parties to the agreement, the British, was no longer there. On the other hand, it supported Pukhtun nationalists’ demand for a separate state that would only further cement the Durand Line. All this contributed to the fears and insecurity of Pakistan’s rulers that resulted in the persecution of Pukhtun nationalists. Despite the power tussle between the nationalists and the government, however, Pukhtuns have become well entrenched in the socio-economic system of Pakistan and for quite understandable reasons.

Pukhtun Integration into Pakistani State System

Like other regions of Pakistan, the NWFP has been faced with the rigours of modernisation accompanied by its attendant dislocation, uprootedness and insecurity. What has exacerbated the problem is that it has been one of the most neglected regions of Pakistan. Whether it is governmental development projects or private sector investments, the NWFP has been the recipient of less than its due share. The colonial regime’s interest in the region, as mentioned above, was solely for strategic reasons and therefore it built only cantonments and military training centres in the region. As far as mechanised agriculture and industrialisation were concerned, the region had failed to attract colonial interest. The infrastructure in the NWFP was as much developed as was required for defence logistics.

After partition Karachi became the hub of industrial activity that gradually flowed into Punjab. The NWFP proved to be such an unattractive area for industrialisation that even the local investors shied away from investing in their region and instead opted for the established industrial regions of Sindh and Punjab. By 1967, although the NWFP had 17.7 per cent of West Pakistan’s population, its share of fixed assets was only 7 per cent, and of production in manufacturing industries around 6 per cent.49 On the other hand, the central government’s bias in favour of Punjab adversely affected the mechanisation of agriculture in the NWFP.50 But such disparity has failed to accentuate ethnic discontent because the benefits that Pukhtuns have accrued from Pakistan have outweighed it. Being the so-called ‘martial’ race, Pukhtuns had been one of those people whom the British regarded as ‘good’ soldiers and thus recruited them to the army in large numbers. In fact, among the Indian Muslims, after Punjabis, Pukhtuns had the largest number in the British army. After partition, it was estimated that 77 per cent of wartime recruitment was from those parts of Punjab which became part of Pakistan whereas 19.5 per cent recruitment came from the NWFP.51

This situation continues to be the same, making Punjabis and Pukhtuns the two over-represented ethnic groups in the army.52 In a political system that came to be dominated and later controlled by the army, this share was certainly going to favourably place Pukhtuns in the power hierarchy of the state and therefore, make them more inclined towards integration in the state rather than separation from it. The concentration of economic activity in the southern parts of Sindh and Punjab obliged Pukhtuns to look southwards rather than northwards (Afghanistan). Pukhtun investors, transporters and labourers have been increasingly moving towards the south for better investment, business and jobs.

Unlike Sindh and Balochistan, where there is a strong resentment that their land has been taken away by Mohajir and Punjabi settlers and their resources are in the control and use of the central government and Punjab, the NWFP’s land and resources are firmly in local hands. Indeed, many Pukhtun civil and military personnel share the exploits of Punjabis and Mohajirs in Sindh.

Administratively, too, unlike Sindh and Balochistan, where Mohajirs and Punjabis dominate, the NWFP is ruled by Pukhtuns. Even in the public sector, there is no significant presence of people from other regions.

The army-dominated system has enabled Pukhtuns, who, at the turn of the century, had one of the smallest number of educated youth compared to many other ethnic groups of India,53 to gradually increase their presence in the civil bureaucracy.54 By late 1960s, Pukhtuns were well integrated in the state system of Pakistan. When the first free elections were held in 1970, their preferences were quite obvious. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) with its seven seats emerged as the main winner (although it had polled less votes, 22.6 per cent, than Jamiat Ullama-i-Islam’s (JUI) 25.4 per cent) whereas, the nationalist party, National Awami Party (NAP), headed by Ghaffar Khan’s son, Wali Khan, won only three seats and 18.4 per cent votes. The combined votes of the centralist parties like the PML, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), JUI and Jamaat-I-Islami were 69.4 per cent.55 Even today this pattern continues to be more or less the same. The political parties that have won the highest number of votes in the 1993 and 1997 elections are the centralist Pakistan Peoples Party and Pakistan Muslim League. Throughout these years the NAP, now ANP (Awami National Party), has been winning only in the prosperous region of Peshawar and Mardan.56 This region is not only the most fertile in the NWFP but also the most educated and thus has a larger share in power. And as a real beneficiary of power and privileges its support for the ANP obviously means not a desire for separation but for a bigger chunk in power and privileges. The ANP’s politics of ethnicity represent these desires very well indeed.

Even when Ghaffar Khan, the ‘champion’ of the downtrodden, was leading the party, it was not clear, as earlier mentioned, what exactly was the nationalists’ plan for the future of Pukhtuns. The main issues that were raised were either the establishment of an independent state or a share in the existing one. Despite being a social reformer and peasant leader, Ghaffar Khan never favoured any radical social or agrarian reforms that would have broken the hold of the landowners and benefited the peasantry. In fact, the Congress ministry’s action to strip the landed gentry of its privileges was not to his likings, as he thought it would antagonise the big khans.57 His son, Wali Khan, has faithfully followed in his footsteps as far as the lack of a clear political plan and commitment to certain social and political programme are concerned. What he has not learned from his father, however, is the populism of Ghaffar Khan. Under Wali Khan, the party lost its populist aura and ended up becoming an elitist pressure group whose politics is to enter into or withdraw from one alliance or another to make or break a government.

Unlike his father, who always remained in contact with the masses and launched mass movements irrespective of the state persecution, Wali Khan’s preferred political strategy until the 1980s was to court arrest or to go abroad at a time of political crisis.58 Never in his long political career has Wali Khan elaborated his political objectives. Instead, he tried to distance himself from goal-oriented politics and programmes that could lead to confrontation. He had an aversion to socialism and had broken his alliance with the Bengali leader Maulana Bhashani in 1967 for the latter’s socialist leanings.59 Although in his public rhetoric he talked about democratic rights, secularism, provincial autonomy and culturallinguistic rights for Pukhtuns, in 1979 he objected to the Baloch leaders’ use of the term nationalities and suggested that they be characterised as ‘distinctive cultural and linguistic entities’.60

In 1972, when his party formed government in the NWFP, in alliance with a religious party, Jamiatul Ulama-I-Islam, Urdu was made the official language, liquor was banned, workers’ strikes banned and police brutality used against peasants. Not only the NAP agreed to the continuation of emergency but also signed the 1973 Constitution, which gave less powers to the provinces than the colonial Government of India Act 1935 did.61 Although he suffered years of persecution and imprisonment at the hands of Pakistani state, he contented himself with the criticism of individual rulers and avoided confronting the state establishment itself, which in Pakistan’s case means the army. No wonder, Wali Khan was cleared of treason charges and released by the military dictator, general Zia ul Haq. All these factors led the leftist and radical elements to quit the party and by 1980s Wali Khan’s party had no fangs left.

Conclusion

Pukhtun nationalism had emerged as an anti-colonial movement of the small khans and peasants. After partition, it turned into the party of those who aspired to control administrative power in the province and to have a sizeable share in the Pakistani state system. In its third phase, the party has become a platform for the provincial investors, civil servants and army personnel. In 1997 elections, the ANP won eight out of its 10 National Assembly seats from Peshawar and Mardan region,62 not only its traditional support base but also the one with the largest number of local investors, civil servants and army personnel. For these groups, nationalism means the protection of their privileges that emanate from private and public sectors of Pakistan. Although separatism did not suit them even before 1970s, after the war in Afghanistan and that country’s destruction even the few idealists cannot think of any future other than the one inside Pakistan.

Furthermore, the Afghan war has created a class of drug and arms dealers that includes not only the tribal drug barons but also army personnel who made fortunes out of the clandestine western arms supplies to the Afghan fighters. Most of these arms and drug dealers have become financiers of various political parties and quite a few even members of the legislative assemblies. However, most of the dirty work against Afghan governments, whether communist or mujahideen, which led to the Taliban rule and civil war, was carried out by Pukhtun officials.

It needs to be mentioned here that the Pakistani establishment’s support for the Taliban is not for the ethnic Pukhtuns of Afghanistan but for the Suni Muslims of that country, which Pukhtuns happen to be. The reason is that Pakistan does not want to see a Shia-dominated government in Kabul that was, under the predominantly Shia Mujahideen group before the Taliban, and would be, if they again come to power, more friendly towards the Shia Iranian government. It is also for this reason that the United States supported Pakistani efforts to dislodge the Mujahideen and help install the Taliban, for the United States, too, had no patience for a group favourably inclined to one of its arch enemies, Iran. The recent developments, however, have changed the perceptions of the United States, and in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks it has secured the support of Pakistan’s military government to eliminate the Taliban, who have proved to be no less troublesome for the United States than Iran. As far as the Pukhtun nationalists of Pakistan are concerned, they have little sympathy for the Taliban, even though the latter are predominantly Pukhtuns. As stated above, Pukhtun nationalists have by now completely integrated into the state system of Pakistan and their main concern now is their place in the power hierarchy rather than their ethnicity. Ironically, the Pukhtuns of Pakistan have played a major role in the destruction of a state, Afghanistan, which, once was the most potent supporter of their nationalism.

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the ANP has become a pressure group, whose politics revolves around bargaining for ministerial portfolios and government permits for its leaders to set up factories. Until 1998, the party at least had two issues to charge its supporters emotionally: opposition to the construction of Kalabagh dam and a demand to change the province’s name from the NWFP to Pukhtunkhwa. After the Nawaz Sharif government had shelved the Kalabagh Dam project, the only issue that was left was the name of the province.

At last, a nationalism that had virtually become nationalism in name seems to have become nationalism for name only. Not surprisingly, the ANP is not a member of the nationalist alliance, Pakistan’s Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM), which was formed in 1998. After all, the Pukhtuns of the NWFP are no longer an oppressed ‘nation’, even if many of them continue to be as oppressed as any people in any of Pakistan’s four provinces.

1. An earlier and shorter version of this paper was presented at the New Zealand Asia International conference, University of Otago, Dunedin, in December 1999. I would like to thank Stephen Castles, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Partha Chatterjee and Gyan Pandey for their invaluable comments. My thanks are also due to the Sociology Program and Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies (CAPSTRANS), at the time headed by Stephen Castles, at the University of Wollongong, for helping me with the travel expenses to Pakistan to carry out fieldwork for this paper. I am grateful to veteran Pukhtun politician, Wali Khan, his son and president of Awami National Party, Asfandyar Wali, Pukhtun nationalists, Latif Afridi and Afrasiab Khattak, dissenting High Court judge in the Bhutto trial case, Justice Qaiser Khan, and academics at Peshawar University, Zulfiqar Gilani, Khalid Saeed and Iqbal Tajik for their time.
    
2. Theodor Adomo, trans. E.F.N Jephcett, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life (Verso, London, 1978), pp. 52–3.
    
3. In his Politics of Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change, (Praeger, New York, 1980), Khalid B. Sayeed says: ‘ … there was no ethnic group in Pakistan in 1947 that was more conscious of its separate linguistic and cultural identity than the Pukhtuns’ (p. 17). Citing the fact that in Punjab the Muslim League was pitted against the government backed party, whereas in the North West Frontier Province it enjoyed the government support as a proof that NWFP was ‘a world of more developed political and ethnic consciousness’ (p. 16). For other such unsubstantiated statements, see Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan Politics: The Zia Years (Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1990), p. 79.
    
4. For Anthony Smith’s ideas on nationalism see his The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981) and National Identity (Penguin Books, London, 1991). For Ernest Gellner’s emphasis on industrialism see Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell, Oxford, 1983) and for Benedict Anderson’s ideas on the role of print capitalism see Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition (Verso, London, 1991).
   
   
5. John Brueilly, Nationalism and the State, second edition (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993), p. 15.
   
   
6. The word Pukhtun is a northern variant used by the Pukhtuns of Peshawar Valley and northern parts of the NWFP. The Pukhtuns of the south and of Afghanistan, whose accent is a softer version of Pashto language, pronounce it as Pushtun. However, we should stick to the former because the members of the NWFP assembly while demanding a change of name for the province used the word Pukhtunkhwa (land of Pukhtuns) rather than Pushtunkhwa.
   
   
7. Asthere is no mention of the ethnic groups in the 1998 census, these figures are based on the 1981 census, according to which Pukhtuns were 68.3 per cent of the total population of the NWFP, excluding some predominantly Pukhtun regions of the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) of the province. See Feroz Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998), p. 190.
   
   
8. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 233. Citing various sources, Roy says that ‘(n)ot very much is known about the ethnic origins of the Pukhtuns; it is clear that they embrace a range of peoples of diverse origins. They are not often mentioned before the eighteenth century although Babur describes them as a community given to plundering who live to the south of Kabul.’
   
   
9. D.G. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is a Battle (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1967), pp. 1–11.
   
   
10. These were Morley–Minto Reforms 1909 and Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms 1920 aimed at granting constitutional rights and electoral participation.
    
    
11. Moreover, Caroe’s colonial self becomes too entangled to conceal his hostility towards anti-British nationalists and his admiration for the pro-British khans and the Muslim League. The Pukhtun leader, Dr Khan Sahib, once told the British Viceroy in the presence of Caroe that ‘if he ever wanted to meet a Muslim League leader he did not have to look far for such a leader was standing right in front of him in the shape of Governor Caroe’. Quoted in Wali Khan, Facts are Facts (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1987), p. 116.
    
    
12. Olaf Caroe, The Pathans (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1983), p. 437.
    
    
13. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980), p. xvii.
    
    
14. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, p. 223.
    
    
15. For details of this concept, see Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1983), p. 15. A passage quoted by Nandy (p. 15) in a footnote deserves to be reproduced here: ‘The notion of the African as a minor … took very strong hold. Spaniards and Boers had questioned whether natives had souls: modern Europeans cared less about that but doubted whether they had minds, or minds capable of adult growth. A theory came to be fashionable that mental growth in the African ceased early, that childhood was never left behind.’
    
    
16. Yu U. Gankovsky, The Peoples Pakistan: An Ethnic History (Nauka Publishing, Moscow, 1971), p. 198.
    
    
17. Ibid. p. 199.
    
    
18. According to Gankovsky (The Peoples Pakistan, p. 200), at the beginning of the nineteenth century there was not a single town with a Pukhtun majority, but by the 1930s 15 out of the 26 cities of the NWFP had Pukhtun majorities.
    
    
19. For an elaborate description of the pivotal role that industrialism plays in the rise of nationalism see Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, and Ernest Gellner, ‘The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation: The Myths of Nation and Class’, in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), Mapping the Nation (Verso, London, 1996), pp. 98–145.
    
    
20. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 9.
    
    
21. Ibid., p. 10.
    
    
22. Jon Anderson, ‘Tribe and Community among the Gilzai Pashtun: Preliminary Notes on Ethnographic Distribution and Variation in Eastern Afghanistan’, Anthropos, vol. 70 (1975), pp. 575–601.
    
    
23. This and the following information on Afghanistan is from Oliver Roy’s Islam and Resistance, pp. 15, 18 and Raja Anwar, trans. Khalid Hasan, The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First-hand Account (Verso, London, 1988), p. 17.
    
    
24. It is interesting to note that in order to build the nation and curtail the influence of tribalism, Abdurrehman imposed the Muslim law, the Shariat, to make the state laws effective. Roy, Islam and Resistance, p. 15.
    
    
25. Tariq Rahman, Language and Politics in Pakistan (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1996), p. 142.
    
    
26. This was originally a Turkish sport, it is a kind of polo in which horsemen try to pick a dead goat with a large arrow.
    
    
27. Sayeed, Pakistan: the Formative Phase, p. 283
    
    
28. Ghaffar Khan, says in his autobiography: ‘I have been told that Amanullah Khan used to call himself the revolutionary king of the Pakhtuns. And indeed it was he who inspired us with the idea of revolution.’ Quoted in Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 18.
    
    
29. ‘O Pathans! Your house has fallen into ruin. Arise and rebuild it—and remember to what race you belong.’ Ghaffar Khan, quoted in Eknath Easwaran, A Man to Match his Mountains: Bacha Khan, Nonviolent Soldier of Islam (Nilgiri Press, Petaluma, 1984), p. 25.
    
    
30. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, p. 65.
    
    
31. Abdul Ghaffar, My Life and Struggle (Pashto edition) (Government Press, Kabul, 1983), pp. 12, 13. My own translation.
    
    
32. Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937–47 (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1988); and Wali Khan, Facts are Facts.
    
    
33. Khan, Facts are Facts, pp. 55–70.
    
    
34. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 20.
    
    
35. Ibid.
    
    
36. Talbot, Provincial Politics, p. 5.
    
    
37. Among the leading khans were: ‘Nawab Sir Muhammed Akbar Khan, the Khan of Hoti, Nawab Mohabat Ali Khan, the Khan of Kohat, Nawab Qutbuddin Khan, the descendant of the pre-British rulers of Tank, and a major jagirdar, Mir Alam Khan, one of the largest landlords of the Peshawar valley, and Muhammed Zaman Khan, the Khan of Kalabat.’ Ibid., p. 17.
    
    
38. Cunningham wrote that, for 90 per cent, the demand for Pakistan was not intelligible and for the ‘average Pathan villager in these parts, the suggestions that there can be such a thing as Hindu domination is only laughable’. Quoted in ibid., p. 29.
    
    
39. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, The Complete Version (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1988), p. 210.
    
    
40. Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan, p. 30.
    
    
41. Ibid., p. 31.
    
    
42. Quoted in ibid., p. 31.
    
    
43. Talbot, Provincial Politics, p. 27.
    
    
44. Khan, Facts are Facts, p. 131. The referendum, like the elections, was based on restricted franchise as only 572,799 people were eligible to vote out of a population of 3.5 million in the settled districts, whereas the tribal areas and the frontier states were not eligible to vote. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 24.
    
    
45. Azad, India Wins Freedom, p. 213.
    
    
46. Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857–1948 (Oxford University Press, London, 1968), pp. 271–2.
    
    
47. Ironically, he had willed to be buried in the Afghan town of Jalalabad, across the Durand Line, a line that he had made the basis of his Pukhtun nationalism and among those ‘naked’ Pukhtuns whom he had so contemptuously rejected to be part of.
    
    
48. Ghaffar Khan was probably the only Congress leader who had the ‘fullest faith’ in Gandhi’s purity and ‘held almost identical views on many a problem’ with his mentor. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, p. 404.
    
    
49. Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics, p. 195.
    
    
50. The NWFP received only 5.4 per cent tractors and 3.3 per cent tubewells out of its share in West Pakistan’s tractors and tubewells (ibid.).
    
    
51. Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1984), pp. 42, 44.
    
    
52. At the same time the Sindhis’ percentage was 2.2 and Balochs’ 0.06 (ibid.).
    
    
53. David Page, Prelude to Pakistan: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920–1932 (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1987), p. 12.
    
    
54. Pukhtun army officers, like Punjabis, have benefited from military governments’ policy to entrench army officers in the civil bureaucracy.
    
    
55. For details of the number of votes and seats see G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (Longman, London, 1974), pp. 128–9.
    
    
56. In 1973 the Bhutto government banned the NAP. Later, when Wali Khan was in jail, Sher Baz Khan Mazari formed the National Democratic Party (NDP), which was joined by the former’s supporters. In 1986, Wali Khan formed the ANP.
    
    
57. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 21.
    
    
58. Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan under Martial Law 1977–1985 (Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1987), p. 111.
    
    
59. Ibid.
    
    
60. Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1981), p. 89.
    
    
61. Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics, p. 200.
    
    
62. Election Special, Herald, Karachi, 1997.
    

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