Publishing Date: Sunday, November 7 2004
Author: Musa Khan Jalalzai
Publisher: Al-Abbas International
Price: Rs 495
At a time when stability is yet to take root in Afghanistan, the book under review is relevant and timely. Given the current situation, analysts say an organised and capable army composed of Afghans can be the only hope in controlling the warring factions and a society split on tribal lines. Musa Khan Jalalzai, the author of Afghan National Army, agrees with the view.
Jalalzai explains how the older Afghan National Army (ANA) was exploited by the Soviet Union during the years preceding the Afghan Jihad. Besides retelling the history of the Afghan army, the author also gives a brief description of the current situation as far as the training and formation of a new Afghan national army is concerned. President Hamid Karzai has set a goal to set up an Afghan national army of about 70,000 troops by the year 2009. Whether the army will be able to maintain law and order in and outside Kabul and stick to its constitutional role is a bit early to tell. The author hopes the new army will not be influenced by the neighbouring countries as was the case during much of the 1970s when the Soviet Union had made deep inroads into the Afghan army set up.

The book offers ample reflection on political history of Afghanistan by telling the story of military coups and wars. Foreign invasions, weak governments in Kabul, feuds among tribal factions, the Afghan army has been in the thick of all the political and military upheavals that the country has been through during its history.
Musa Khan Jalalzai makes an attempt to focus on the Afghan National Army (ANA) as it was during the days of the Soviet invasion. He picks up the threads of history of the Afghan army from the Saur Revolution in 1978 against the government in Kabul -- the rebellion led and carried out by the 17th division of the army. The coup or the revolution, as you may choose to call it, overthrew and executed the country's first president, Muhammad Daoud, who had himself come to power in a coup that toppled forty-years-old monarchy of King Zahir Shah.
The new government, led by People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's founder Nur Muhammad Taraki, began to implement communist-style policies. Taraki government received huge aid from the Soviet Union in the form of military equipment and technical advice. No wonder, the officer corps of Afghanistan was largely under the control of the the PDPA, working in collaboration with the neighbouring Soviet Union. The PDPA also claimed that it enjoyed support among the Afghan intelligentsia which favoured the modernisation of Afghanistan on the pattern of the Soviet Union.
We come to know through the book that military coups were nothing new to the Afghan army at the time of the Saur uprising. Earlier, they had been part of the 1973 military coup against the government of King Zahir Shah by his cousin Sardar Muhammad Daud. Like the Saur revolution, it was undertaken by a section of the Afghan army soldiers who eventually handed over power to Sardar Muhammad Duad.
It is quite interesting to note that there were some 80,000 Afghan soldiers in 1979. But only a year after the Soviet invasion the number reduced to about 20,000 as a result of casualties and desertions.
Jalalzai has incorporated in the book a few articles by other authors as well. One on the defence strength of Afghanistan from 1947 to 1978 by Dr Ahsan-ur-Rehman throws light on the organisational structure of the armed forces and the ministry of interior during that time. Nasrullah Safi dissects Soviet military tactics in Afghanistan. Lawrence Freedman analyses the changing forms of military conflict the world over. This chapter appears loosely attached to the main theme of the book. And one by President Hamid Karzai outlines the leadership of Afghan tribes from 1953 to 1978.
The book which could have been put together in a better way lacks in coherent text. Some editing could have made it a smooth reading.
Article published in the News on Sunday, 7th November 2004
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